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Roundtable Discussion
Saturday, March 29, 1997
Vanderbilt University School of Law
Nashville, Tennessee
The Symposium panelistsparticipatingin this discussionincluded
ProfessorJosephW. Deilapenna,ProfessorTed Hagelin,
ProfessorEdwin L.-C. Lai, ProfessorHaroldG. Maier,*
Mr. Yu Ping, ProfessorJohn M. Rogers,"
Ms. Ying Juan Rogers,***and
ProfessorPeter Wesley-Smith...
Ms. Laurelyn Douglas:*****

I want to welcome back our
distinguished panelists and welcome
you to the roundtable, which we hope
will be an informal opportunity to ask
questions and review some of the issues
presented
during
the
sessions
yesterday. I also encourage students
who might be participating in research
on this topic to speak up.

Professor Harold G. Maier:

This is going to be informal, and
that's the best thing about sessions like
this. rl help us get started, but I
expect the discussion will soon carry
itself.
Those of you who were here for
yesterday's sessions may recall that I
suggested what we are discussing is

* Harold G. Maier is the David Daniels Allen Professor of Law at Vanderbilt
Law School and the Founder and Faculty Advisor of the Vanderbilt Journal of
Transnational Law (Journal). Professor Maier served as the moderator for this
discussion.
0. John M. Rogers is the Brown, Todd & Heyburn Professor of Law
at the
University of Kentucky College of Law. He is the author of Anticipating Hong
Kong's Constiuiionfrom a U.S. Legal Perspective, which appears in the May 1997
issue of the Journal.
***Ying Juan Rogers is a Trade Consultant and Proprietor of Shadeland
East
International in Lexington, Kentucky. Ms. Rogers was a featured speaker at the
Symposium.
Peter Wesley-Smith is a Professor of Law at the University of Hong
Kong.
He is the author of The Future of Hong Kong: Not What It Used to Be, which
appears in the May 1997 issue of the Journal.
..
Laurelyn Douglas, the 1996-97 Executive Symposium Editor of the
Journal,introduced the panelists for the roundtable discussion.
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something that is almost purely
speculative during this symposium. We
certainly know something of the history
of the past. But even that, I think, Is
not as well understood, at least in the
United States and, perhaps in the
Western Hemisphere in general, as it
could be.
But what we are trying to do in this
meeting is to predict what Hong Kong is
going to become. One thing of which we
can be fairly confident is that we can't
know now what Hong Kong will become.
Yet speculating is often worthwhile,
and so this morning I've asked Peter
[Wesley-Smith]-and I gave him two
minutes' warning-to continue what he
had done at the outset of yesterday's
sessions.
You'll remember that he
described a history of the relationship
among Hong Kong, various treaties, and
what is now the People's Republic of
China (hereinafter P.R.C.).
I've asked Peter if he would be
willing to begin today's session by giving
a projection of what he sees as the
future of Hong Kong and the People's
Republic of China for the next twenty to
twenty-five years. I expect the other
panelists will get started from that, and
then we'll get audience members
involved as well.
Professor Peter Wesley-Smith:

I think the first thing to say is that
a historian should never try to predict
the future.
I think the usual assumption by
most people is that Hong Kong in terms
of internal politics and domestic legal
affairs will become very much like
Singapore.
For those who know
Singapore, this might be a rather
distressing prognostication. Singapore,
of course, is in some sense formally a
democratic system, but in practice Is
not democratic at all. It has a very
tough government and is a "rugged
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society," where the leaders of the
People's Action Party suppress dissent
in a very repressive manner and use the
legal system to achieve such ends.
And
I
think
the
Chinese
government has been very impressed
with the Singapore model. They were
very impressed with the Hong Kong
colonial model. And, indeed, when they
started off talking and thinking about
the future of Hong Kong, what they
initially intended to do was to simply
cross out the "United Kingdom" where it
appeared and replace it with the
"People's Republic of China."
The
appeal of the Hong Kong model to the
P.R.C. is that Hong Kong had a system
which guaranteed imperial authority,

with virtually no democratic institutions
at all, or any limitation upon the
autocratic executive power of the Hong
Kong government.
But that wasn't possible as it
turned out. The Basic Law is a much
more liberal document. But I think the
P.R.C. is intending that the Basic Law
be administered as far as possible in an
autocratic fashion so that Hong Kong
will continue to be a hot-bed of
inequities and perform its role in
business and international trade, not
only for its internal benefit but for the
benefit of China. But Hong Kong won't
in any sense become genuinely
democratic. There will be some slight
democratization as time goes on, but
very, very little, with much the same
kind of attitude towards human rights.
The one point which I didn't think
was made adequately yesterday was
that at least there is the institutional
protection in Hong Kong of an
independent judiciary. The great test
will be whether that judiciary can make
the Basic Law work as a document
which tends to restrict the authority of
governments.
In Singapore, I don't
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think that's so: there isn't a history or
appearance of judicial autonomy.
I
believe even to mention the words
.compliant judiciary" is to cause a great
problem. But I think in Hong Kong it
will be quite some time, if ever, before
the judiciary becomes completely
compliant.
The only major difference, I think,
between the Hong Kong and Singapore
models is that Singapore does not have
the People's Republic next door. So the
difference will be that there is some
uneasy relationship between Hong Kong
and the P.R.C. The P.R.C. obviously
intends to exercise a considerable role,
despite the purpose of the Basic Law
being to provide something like a
"Chinese wall" in a sense between Hong
Kong and the
Central People's
Government. But I don't think any

realist in Hong Kong expects that those
kinds of constitutional guarantees will,
in fact, work very successfully in

practice.
Just

one

example:

the

Chief

Executive designate, Mr. Tung Cheehwa, was apparently chosen by a
selection
committee,
which was
composed of Hong Kong residents. In
effect, though, he was chosen by the
Chinese side. Although there was an
election and there were a dozen
candidates, four of whom were taken
seriously, it nonetheless became very
clear that China had chosen Mr. Tung
Chee-hwa.
They had chosen him
probably fifteen years ago when they
provided something like a hundred
million U.S. dollars to rescue his
shipping company. He was very much
Peking's man, and so he was duly
selected.
Tung Chee-hwa is quite an
impressive man in many respects. He
was a member of Governor Patten's
Executive Council, so he has links with
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the current system.
The present
question is, to what degree is he going
to be independent of the P.R.C. and to
what degree is he going to promote the
idea of a high degree of autonomy? One
particularly important area where this
issue is raised is in regard to the

appointment of the Chief Justice for the
Special Administrative Region.
Currently,
there
are
two
candidates-not quite the word one
would think of for a top post like that,
at least, not in the British system,
although maybe it's appropriate here,
where there are elections for judges-for
Chief Justice. One of them has the
respect of the entire legal profession
and is very highly regarded generally,
and who everyone thinks would be an
excellent Chief Justice, and he's likely
to have the integrity and courage that
are perhaps needed in the judiciary in
this transitional period.
The other candidate is a sitting
member of the Court of Appeal. He's
very British in demeanor and manner.
He's married to a non-Chinese woman.
He is Chinese, as is the other candidate.
But this second candidate has always
been seen as very British and very
different from his sister, Lu Yu-chu,
who is a total-well, she's an unguided
missile, according to the Chinese. But
she's traditionally been a thorn in the
side of the colonial administration. Not
unintelligent, but very unpredictable,
and seen as very left wing. She's a
member of the National People's
Congress. [Ms. Liu has since died.]
And her brother Benjamin Liu has been
seen as a contrast, the British side of
the family. And yet, now he is openly
campaigning to be Chief Justice, and
apparently elements of the Chinese
government want him to be appointed.
They don't trust the other candidate,
because he is seen as too independent.
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Andrew Li, the other candidate,
was on the Executive Council with Tung
They are close friends.
Chee-hwa.
Apparently Tung Chee-hwa has great
respect for him and wants to appoint
him. But the appointment has not yet
been made, although one would have
expected it to have been made by now.
And the inside information, the
accuracy of which I can't guarantee, is
that there's a real battle going on. And
that if Andrew Li is appointed Chief
Justice, then that would be some
indication that Tung Chee-hwa is
prepared to stand up to the Chinese
side, and the Chinese side is prepared
to give in or at least to be flexible about
this issue.
And if Li were to be Chief Justice,
then I think that would greatly
strengthen the hopes that the judiciary,
at least in the first ten years, will be
impartial and full of integrity, and will
provide, I think, honest interpretations
of the Basic Law and the laws to ensure
a high degree of autonomy for Hong
Kong. [Mr. Andrew Li was subsequently
appointed Chief Justice of the Hong
Kong Court of Final Appeal.]
I'll just finish in regards to
predictions of a statement by Ducey
and Pious on Tommy Goth: "Prediction
difficult,
always
extremely
is
particularly in regards to the future."
Professor Maier:

Does anyone have any comments?

Professor John M. Rogers:

Let me mention in more detail the
dispute over the Provisional Legislature.
The Joint Declaration of 1984 called for
the creation of at least a partiallyelected legislature. And some of the
details were spelled out in the Basic
Law, when it was finally adopted in
1990. That Basic Law calls for a sixtymember Legislative Council, twenty of
whom are elected from single member
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constituencies in the fashion of
elections with which we are most
familiar in the United States. Thirty of
the sixty are elected from what are
called functional-constituency elections,
and the remaining ten of them are
elected by an electoral commission.
That was the model that was
followed for the 1995 elections, which
the Chinese found so objectionable.
Now, the Chinese can certainly object
that they-rather than the British
Electoral Commission-should have the
electoral commission that appoints the
ten: that objection is easy to see. The
Chinese could object that the functional
constituencies were divided improperly,
and I believe they have objected to that.
As for functional constituencies, they
theoretically give members of various
professions or groups in the Hong Kong
workforce a voice in the legislature. For
example, the legal profession gets to
elect or choose a member of the
Legislative Council. Similarly, various
other
professional
groups
elect
members, the workers' group, and so
on. But the effect of the representation
can be numerically disproportionate.
Indeed, the legal profession may be the
smallest group. You know, if you have
six million people total in the
population, and you have twenty
representatives chosen by the single
member constituency method, then
each one of those twenty represents
approximately 300,000 people.
Yet
there's one person elected under the
functional-constituency
method
to
represent the legal profession consisting
of most solicitors and barristers, but
that's a total of less than 5000 people.
So already the demographics can skew
the results and expectations
of
democratic processes.
All the same, it's hard to see how
the Chinese could object to the twenty
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elected members, but as of June 30th
the whole Legislative Council will,
In the
effectively, be wiped out.
meantime, the Chinese have essentially
appointed a provisional legislature of
sixty
people,
who
representof
supposedly-the
same
sort
distribution.
With
regard
to
representatives selected by singlemember constituencies,
there are
certainly a substantial number of cases
where the person who was removed
from office was then replaced by a
candidate who lost In the original
election process.
Now that's what
passes for democracy as the Chinese
Government understands It and has
given rise to the current dispute about
the legality of the legislature.
It's also important to understand
that there Is a working majority in the
existing Legislative Council-not a
hundred percent obviously, but a
working majority nonetheless, in the
existing legislative counsel-that Is prodemocracy. Now, had the legislature
been elected entirely by single member
constituencies in 1995, it would have
been overwhelmingly pro-democracyat least given the clear voting patternsbecause the democratic group got about
eighty-five percent of the vote. But the
legislature is not elected on democratic
principle.
Further, some of the
members of the democratic group
defected after the Legislative Council
began meeting. As a result, the actual
breakdown Is something like twenty-six
pro-democracy out of sixty. And this Is
what the Chinese have found to be
unacceptable. So they've replaced It
with a provisional legislature which has
no explicit basis in law, let's put it that
way. As I mentioned yesterday, both
the Law Society and the Bar Association
in Hong Kong have issued a report
saying that in their opinion it's illegal.
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The differences [between the two
reports] are simply in the nuances as to
how they describe the extent of the
provisional legislature's illegality and
how it might best be cured. This event
and the report itself seem to be of
significant portent, definitely something
to which attention should be paid,
especially if-to borrow a phrase Peter
[Wesley-Smith] used yesterday-there
are going to be document fetishists,
then they'd better look and see how that
document [the Basic Law] has already
been treated.
Professor Maier:

Peter [Wesley-Smith] and John
[Rogers], thank you.
I want to say
again, if any of the audience members
have questions you'd like to raise,
please do so. The purpose of this
session is to get everybody involved.
We'd rather not just sit here and talk at
you, though we will, we can, we could
talk forever. But we'd like to get you
involved, so if you have any comments,
please feel free to make them.
First, though, I want to ask other
members of the panel if they wish to
comment on the remarks by Peter and
John this morning.

Professor Ted Hagelin:

I'll certainly play devil's advocate
for a moment, although I pretty much
agree with the comments made so far,
at least in the short run. But I do think
it is important to look at this situation
in a bigger context, and that's this: no
nation in modem history, other than a
nation that has been defeated and
forced to change, has undergone such a
dramatic transformation as China in
the past twenty-five years. What China
has accomplished really is remarkable.
Another part of the context that we
haven't really raised, but which I do
think is important, is that China will
never look like the United States; that's
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just not going to happen. It will be
distinctly Chinese. But I think one of
the worthwhile exercises through this Is
to reflect a bit on the United States. We
wag a finger at China in the United
States, which is not the way to get
anything done over there, about
improving their criminal justice system.
And the Chinese are then fond of
reminding us about the Rodney King
trial and the O.J. Simpson trial, and
they say, "If that's what you mean
about a criminal justice system, no
thank you." We are continually at the
Chinese about patent law reform. The
truth of the matter today is that, in the
U.S., patent litigation is a marketing
strategy. Companies use litigation to
thwart competitors. And the Chinese
say, "If that's what you mean by patent
law reform, no thank you."
So, I do think we need to look at
ourselves in the mirror. Plus, we need
to note that China did not embark on
these radical free market reforms
because they had an epiphany in
Beijing. China's leadership embarked
on these free market reforms because
the standard of living throughout the
Mao period was steadily declining.
China realized that only foreign
investment and free market reform
could improve the standard of living
and sustain the Communist party.
China does see the twenty-first
century as its century, and it sees itself
as now truly moving to center-stage in
the world. How far the government Is
willing to go, very pragmatically, to
achieve that center-stage position, no
one knows. They may well embrace free
elections, if it does allow China to
assume what the Chinese leadership
believes is its rightful role in the future
in the world.
In the short run, yes, I do think
there are going to be problems. But I
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think it is very difficult to look down the
line in the long run without at least
considering a very different kind of
scenario.

Professor Maier:

This is pragmatism we're looking
at.

Professor Hagelin:

Professor Maier:
Ms. Ying Juan Rogers:

I think the most outstanding
feature
of China
today
is
its
pragmatism.

Yes.

Since I'm not a lawyer, I won't get
into details about the law. I have a
different view of the future of Hong
Kong under the law because I was bom
in China.
I think the Chinese
government has to figure out how to
deal with the pressing issues of concern
to them. If Hong Kong's relative
autonomy makes China worried, then
China may seek to relocate the financial
center away from Hong Kong, or maybe
even attempt to move the legal system
into Shanghai over the next five or ten
years. They may think they can still
control the financial center and its
assets.
The idea may be just to move the
big center from Hong Kong to Shanghai,
and to make Shanghai a financial
center just as Hong Kong is now. Then
they'll gradually just replace officials of
high rank in Hong Kong with those from
mainland China. They can replace the
directors of a university, putting in
Chinese citizens instead of British
citizens, or in the legal system, they
may even replace a Hong Kong or
British judge with a judge from
mainland China.
If the Chinese proceed this way,
then in five to ten years, they could
gradually integrate Hong Kong into the
mainland Chinese economic and legal
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system. So I'm not sure that Hong
Kong will become, as Peter was
suggesting earlier, really like the
Singapore model. One will be more
capitalist, while the other will really be
more communist, in nature.
Professor Maier:

Is it your Impression that the
underlying purpose for moving the
financial center from Hong Kong to
Shanghai would be to lessen the
probability or the difficulties associated
with potential protests against Chinese
policies in Hong Kong, or to reduce the
likelihood of such protests?

Ms. Rogers:

Yes, but of course it won't be
achieved all in one day; instead it would
be a gradual pace of integration, until
eventually-in
about
ten yearsShanghai displaces or at least becomes
equal to what Hong Kong Is now as a
financial center. And Hong Kong won't
really be "Hong Kong" anymore, at least
as it's thought of now; it will be "China."
So in some ways, it may be
pointless to talk about which legal
system or model will be dominant,
although I don't think many people
believe that at the moment. It won't be
easy for China to switch much of the
transactional emphasis to Shanghai,
because it's not currently as automated
as Hong Kong. Yet, I think that's
China's goal, that in the end that's what
they're going to do. So the importance
of Hong Kong's legal system may
become immaterial: it will just become
China's.

Professor Maier:

There's a question related to the
stability of Hong Kong's role as financial
center from a gentlemen in the
audience? Sir?

Audience Participant 1:

I'm curious about the issue of
monetary conversions and also the
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tradeability of various market shares,
because it seems like anything less
than full convertibility would create
arbitrage
tremendous
some
opportunities within the market itself,
possibly setting it up for quite a crash
Could the
in the next year or so.
panelists comment on the status of
converting RenMinBi to Hong Kong
dollars, as well as the various types of
shares in the "Chinese" market and the
limits on who can buy and sell these
shares?

Professor Hagelin:

China keeps talking about floating
the RenMinBi, but they've not yet
allowed it to float freely in the sphere of

the international currency market. The
prospect of doing so presents a very big
problem for China. If China were to
allow it to float, it would be valued
somewhere between thirty-five and forty
percent, partly because an awful lot of
the Bank of China's loan assets are
involved in dinosaur companies making
things that nobody wants to buy.
That's a serious problem. Plus, one of
the risks, really the primary risk, is the
extensive trade going on between Hong
Kong and China with the Hong Kong
dollar, which does float and is a very,
very strong currency and the RenMinBi,
which does not.
In terms of the B shares, those
There are
shares trade frequently.
Chinese companies registered on the
New York Stock Exchange. Plus, there
are many Chinese companies registered
on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange.
Registration of Chinese companies on
the Hong Kong Stock Exchange is not
without its problems. For example, one
of the companies that was registered on
the Hong Kong exchange made a
disclosure that was totally bogus. The
company took the money raised on the
exchange and paid off all sorts of people
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instead of reinvesting in the company.
But the investors took that risk.
Nonetheless, there are efforts to require
a more serious disclosure by Chinese
companies seeking listings on the Hong
Kong Stock Exchange in the future.
Yet,
the
uncertainty
about
currency
convertibility
and
the
reliability of corporate disclosure Is
likely to persist for some time.
To Illustrate, I'll share a little story.
When we went to Shenzhen in '95 I
wanted to see the stock exchange, but I
couldn't find anyone willing to take us
into the stock exchange.
So, I
requested that our delegation at least
see a broker's office, so we were
eventually taken to the largest
brokerage house in Shenzhen, but this
much-praised place turns out to be
merely a modest little store front. We
walked in, and we found all the Chinese
brokers sitting around on little stools,
watching a tote board and then running
back and forth to a window to make
trades. It looks a little unreal right now,
but everyone there is fascinated by it.
Cab drivers talk about how they made
twenty percent on a particular stock.
So the atmosphere is a bit incredible,
more than a little wild and very volatile.

As I said yesterday, if you can
Imagine being in California for the gold
rush in the 1850s, then you'll get a
sense of what southern China looks
today like.
Professor Joseph Dellapenna:

Indeed, there were several large
riots in Shenzhen during the last year,
all provoked by rumors and sometimes
facts about manipulations taking place
on the stock exchanges. Investors may
be sitting around when suddenly the
stock market drops sharply for no
apparent reason, and those investors
and the population take to the streets.
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Professor Hagelin:

But, again, context is important;
Shenzhen is not, say, Albania. The
economy is not being propped up by a
pyramid scheme.

Audience Participant 2:

If the Chinese have the authority to
move the center for financial control
from Hong Kong to Shanghai, and if
they succeed in doing that, do you
think foreign investments would follow?

Ms. Rogers:

It could pose a bigger problem,
potentially, but such a move won't
happen suddenly, only gradually. On
the convertibility issue, I think that the
Chinese RenMinBi will be convertible to
the U.S. dollar very soon. Plus, it's

already possible to change the Chinese
RenMinBi to Hong Kong dollars, so that
shows potential for confidence in the
market, in the long run.
Professor Hagelin:

But that
official rate.

Ms. Rogers:

Yes, it's at the official rate, but it
still indicates a relatively hassle-free
way of changing money.

Professor Dellapenna:

If you know the right jewelry store
you can get a better rate.

Professor Rogers:

Maybe, but the significance of
having U.S. dollars isn't really as great
as it was ten years ago. Now, it's no big
deal; it's part of a routine process.

Audience Participant 3:

Professor Wesley-Smith, can you
tell us what is going to happen to the
non-Chinese Hong Kong people residing
in Hong Kong now who have enjoyed
the full status of Hong Kong citizenship
so far?

conversion is at the

Professor Wesley-Smith:

That's not entirely clear.

Professor Maier:

Are you one of this sort of citizen
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over there?
Professor Wesley-Smith:

Yes, for the time. Sometimes I
regard myself as white Chinese, but not
as quite Chinese; but not everyone
agrees with that.
The provision for permanent
resident status is set out in the Basic
Law.
Under the Basic Law, a
permanent resident is a person who
can't be deported or removed and is not
subject to visa control. Now, as far as I
can see from the discussions from the
Chinese side, they haven't really been
taking any notice of what test is set out
in the Basic Law. The question of
residency and citizenship status has
resulted in an utter and total confusion
which is affecting Hong Kong in various
ways, amongst the overseas Hong Kong
community; the Hong Kong diaspora is
faced with the issue of whether it Is
necessary to be physically present in
Hong Kong at the time of the
transition-a
magic
stroke
of
midnight-in order to retain one's
rights. Of course, this Is putting great
pressure on the airlines, which rumor
has it are charging special fares, and
making a fortune out of this concern by
members of Hong Kong's overseas
community. The requirement seems to
be that any Hong Kong citizen who was
a permanent resident, perhaps by birth,
but who has now decided to live
elsewhere, say the United States, must
be safe in Hong Kong on June 30th and
July 1st if he or she wishes to retain full
permanent resident status.
The non-Chinese residents-and
they are traditionally British people,
U.K. residents--of Hong Kong are those
who typically entered Hong Kong
without being subject to visa control or
work permit requirements. If they've
been in Hong Kong for at least seven
years, then the idea is that they've
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acquired iron-clad Hong Kong residency
status. Of course, that's changing now
and at the end of this month, I think,
they're just about to lose it. That's the
proposal anyway. But there is some
resistance in the Legislative Council,
where some have argued that even
though the Brits shouldn't have the
right to acquire residency status like
that in the future, those who already
have the right to such status shouldn't
have it taken away. That's a novel
argument from the perspective of the
immigration law, though I think that it's
an obviously just argument in terms of
the retrospectivity of law and its effect.
There's another group of nonChinese residents who will be affected
as well. This group consists of people
who-unlike someone like me, who has
the right to vote in another countryare non-Chinese people who were born
and bred in Hong Kong and do not have
a passport for another country. There
was a huge campaign on their behalf
which was reasonably successful with
the British government for about ten
thousand people who are categorized in
this status.
The British have now
agreed to give these Hong Kong-born
non-Chinese U.K. passports. They will
become permanent residents of Hong
Kong.
And I don't think that this
arrangement is very unsatisfactory for
them, because they have a place to call
home. Admittedly, it's only Hong Kong
and they're not Chinese nationals, but
they are permanent residents with the
right of abode, and no deportation
removal or visa control. So they are not
stateless: they have been given U.K.
residence.
Audience Participant 4:

While working for a law firm in
Saudi Arabia, I became very aware of a
very unique and sticky thing between
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia called a

764

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 30:747

political condominium which functions
as a neutral zone. It was organized
because the Saudis and the Kuwaitis
couldn't decide who really owned that
part of the world-specifically, the
mineral interests under it-but needed
to find a way to divide that mineral
interest and to administer civil issues in
this "Jurisdiction." My question is this:
could Hong Kong be thought of as one
of
the
world's
first
political
condominiums?
Professor Wesley-Smith:

A
condominium,
in
my
understanding, exists where there are
two nations
sharing
government
facilities and operations in a particular
territory, such as there was in New
Hebrides, or what is now Vanuatu. But
with Hong Kong, there's ultimately only
one country involved, and that's China.
There was a thought at one stage that
the U.K. and China might share
government facilities in Hong Kong, but
that proposal was abandoned by the
British back in the '50s or '40s. So
Hong
Kong
can't be
a
true
condominium according to current
definitions.
There is and there will be a sharing
of power between the P.R.C. and the
Hong Kong Special Administrative
Region (hereinafter Hong Kong SAR)
itself, especially at the local Hong Kong
government level. In that sense there Is
power sharing, but no more so than as
in a federal system like that found in
the United States.
Incidentally, we can't call the
structure in Hong Kong "a federal
system" for political reasons: the P.R.C.
thinks that to do so would be to imply
that Hong Kong is sovereign or
independent of China, because the
P.R.C. thinks that all federal systems
are a result of a combination of
independent countries
that come
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together to form a federal system. This
of course is patently untrue, but that's
what the P.R.C. believes. So we can't
use the term "federal" to describe the
structure of the relationship between
the P.IRC. and the Hong Kong SAR,
even though it's more in the nature of a
federal system than anything else;
certainly, the arrangement in Hong
Kong is not a "condominium," at least
as I understand the term.
Professor Maier:

The view the Chinese take of the
current system reminds me of the
definition of a "factoid," a term we used
when I was in the State Department:
namely, a "factoid" was a statement
clearly contrary to fact, believed by no
one, but used and accepted by all.

Audience Participant 5:

By acquiring Hong Kong and the
great amount of business activities
there, what does China get?

Professor Hagelin:

Well, a tremendous boost, a lot.
While-to be perfectly straightforwardI'm not at all sure that there will be any
sort of shift to Shanghai, China benefits
enormously. Hong Kong really has a
unique strategic position, certainly with
respect to Southeast Asia, and China
now manages Hong Kong's role as a
gateway. The most important thing that
China acquires, though, is an incredibly
skilled professional and managerial
population. China is in desperate need
of managers and well-educated, welltraveled
professionals
to
make
previously state-subsidized ventures in
China viable and of interest to investors
worldwide and to overseas markets.
Hong Kong's population helps provide
that. Plus, there's a huge amount of
capital, which will continue to flow to
Beijing from Hong Kong, even if the
Hong Kong stock market moves to

Shanghai.
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Professor Wesley-Smith:

I'd agree; there's really no question
of a great wodge of resources from Hong
Kong being transferred to the Central
People's government.

Professor Rogers:

I'd like to make a simple footnote
to that. What I want to try to say
relates to the relationship between
politics and economics. There seems to
be an assumption that China can deal
with politics and external affairs, but
that China can leave the economics of
Hong Kong alone. But Hong Kong is a
very rich and tempting pot for China,
and there are ways of tapping into that
pot without doing it directly or on the
surface. For instance, if you need to get
licensing approval, you may have to get
that from an official who owes his or her
position to somebody else to whom an
allegiance is due because of a certain
"friendliness," and this allegiance can
be traced ultimately to someone high up
in Beijing. Most of us would call a
system of favors "corruption," although
I'm not sure that corruption Is the right
word for it. Yet, when the political
decisions are ultimately, if indirectly,
being made in Beijing, then some
money is going to flow to Beijing;
people, or the corporations or interests
they represent, are going to be aware of
the need to deal with the reality of that
sort of system, and it's going to have
very tangible monetary manifestations.
For instance, there was a question
as to whether there would be a third
airline in Hong Kong.
The final,
apparent agreement was to stick with
the two existing airlines: Dragon Air and
Cathay Pacific. Perhaps part and parcel
of
that
agreement
was
an
understanding that a certain amount of
the stock of one of those airline
companies would be controlled by
Chinese interests. Now, the underlying
question Is:
would those Chinese
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interests have been able to obtain that
stock in one of those two airlines if it
hadn't been for the threat of having a
competitive third airline in Hong Kong?
Keep in mind that approval for the third
airline would have had to come from a
sympathetic government in Beijing,
which would have the effect of making
that third carrier a Chinese airline. It's
not as though someone in Beijing
explicitly instructed Cathay Pacific to
trade a percentage of stock to China in
exchange for reduced competition. But
it's an example of how, indirectly,
profitable assets that are part of Hong
Kong's "pot" flow to mainland China. I
may not be explaining it exactly, but
certainly such things happen.
Professor Wesley-Smith:

I agree with your assessment
totally. I think the fact that Hong Kong
has been a British colony with a quite
separate system of government has
meant
that
there's
been
an
immunization between Hong Kong and
China. But as soon as you lose that,
then the wall becomes much more
porous, and the connections become
much more diverse.

Professor Dellapenna:

This is one of the few points that
really concerned a number of people
whom we met while I was leading the
ABA delegation to Hong Kong several
weeks ago.
During our meetings with business
people there, quite a few expressed to
us misgivings that some people might
find their arms twisted and end up
selling controlling interests or even
minority interests in their companies as
a result. One of the members of our
delegation raised the Cathay Pacific
transaction.
Twenty-five percent of
Cathay Pacific stock was sold to China's
government, I think, or at least to its
investment
group,
the
Chinese
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International Trade and Investment
Corporation.
And the question was asked: was
the Cathay Pacific a case where arms
were twisted? And the answer came
back: No, no. In fact, that was a sale
at a "fair price."
But, actually it was below market
value, according to our Informant. "Fair
price" does not necessarily mean
market value on the Hong Kong stock
exchange. When pressed, the person
we asked finally said: "Oh, no, no, It
was below that, but it was a fair price."
So, It's rather how you look at
things.
One of the incentives for such
arrangements in business transactions,
of course, Is that it meant there would
not be a Chinese-funded airline as a
competitor to Cathay Pacific. Because
Cathay Pacific now is, in effect, the
Chinese airline, even though seventyfive percent of it is still owned by the
original investment group.
Professor Wesley-Smith:

There's a term in Hong Kong,
"friendship price." I don't know if that
term is used elsewhere, but essentially
it connotes the fact that P.R.C.
instrumentalities can obtain a lower
"friendship price" on certain things.

Audience Participant 6:

I'd like to comment on earlier
discussions about what it is that China
"gets" most with the return of Hong
Kong. While It's true that China Is In
need of more skilled workers, Hong
Kong has been a window to education
and
international
managerial
professionalism for China for some time
now. These people have already helped
to open China as a country and as a
market for export. So, even though
there are issues to be addressed that
way, that's not the most important
thing China "gets" when the transition
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occurs. Really, what China gets most is
pride; if you are Chinese, you get back
your pride.
To have Hong Kong back from
Britain ends a humiliation of China; it
restores Chinese pride. It's not about
acquiring materials or markets or
money, really, but pride.
As for the issue of Beijing's
influence on business in Hong Kong, I
think there is a perception of the
Chinese as not always being "straight"
or honest, that they break promises or
breach contracts.
But there are
different ideas about honor, depending
on history and culture, and that
influences the government of China in
many ways.
The Chinese government hasn't
explicitly or openly broken a contract,
though they obviously do so in a very
subtle way.
My concern is that if western
governments put a lot of pressure on
the Hong Kong government or the
Chinese government to try to get Hong
Kong to be more independent, then the
Chinese government will take that
pressure as a threat to Chinese
territorial integrity, the idea of which is
very important to Chinese people and
the Chinese government. If Chinese
officials encounter such pressure, then
they will feel compelled to take stricter
control over Hong Kong, when both
such action by China and pressure
from the West are not necessary.
Politically, Hong Kong won't ever be
totally dependent on Chinese officials,
because of leaders like Tung Chee-hwa.
He is in many ways controlled by China,
but with him the Chinese government
can
let
Hong
Kong
function
independently in many ways, in many
areas. If we in the West decide to pay a
lot of attention to the Chinese and
independence for Hong Kong, then the

770

VANDERBILT JOURNAL OF TRANSNATIONAL LAW

[VoL 30:747

Chinese may press for even more
control of the Hong Kong government.
Mr. Yu:

In
connection
with
that
observation, I would like to say that in
some sense the Chinese government
had no choice but to take over Hong
Kong at that moment when China
stopped its negotiations with Hong
Kong-or with the British government.
This issue of choice directly relates to
another question, which is this: if the
Chinese government did not propose to
take over Hong Kong, what would
happen to the Chinese government in
Beijing? For Beijing's leaders, this may
be the more serious question because it
relates to the stability of their positions.
Because they are Chinese people,
educated in China under the older
systems of either communism or
nationalism, all of the current Chinese
leaders-including the nationalists and
those before the nationalists-in all
forms of the government, insisted that
Hong Kong become a part of China, as
Professor Wesley-Smith mentioned
yesterday.
A major question faced by each
successive generation of Chinese
leadership was how and when Hong
Kong was to become a part of China.
Whenever the British government
proposed something to China, China
had no choice but to answer that China
would recover Hong Kong. So now it is
expected that this promise to the
Chinese people by Chinese leadership
will be kept. But Hong Kong is a source
of concern to the Chinese government;
unless they can keep Hong Kong going,
China will be in a dilemma. Otherwise,
many will think that China ruined Hong
Kong, that the Chinese scammed Hong
Kong, and the loss will be seen as
China's fault. It's in China's selfinterest to keep Hong Kong as
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prosperous as when they received it; it
is to the leaders' benefit. And they need
Hong Kong, directly, to contribute to the
perception of China. They want Hong
Kong to continue as a free market; it's a
way for China to develop and maintain
regular contact with the rest of the
world, and also a way to draw the
international investments through Hong
Kong into China. And I think that
China will continue to maintain its
national fiscal center. It's not so much

that China intends to take over Hong
Kong, to recover it absolutely-that goal
is historical and political, but not so
practical.
Professor Rogers:

That seems to be the conventional
yet insightful view-namely that China
has an underlying political reason for
wanting to get Hong Kong back, but
their number-one priority is to keep it
economically successful. I would like to
suggest that while ensuring Hong
Kong's continued economic success is a
very, very high priority for the Chinese
government, they have one priority that
is higher than that, a priority which will
always be higher than that. The top
priority, I think, for the people
apparently in charge of Beijing is that
they will continue to be the people who
rule China; they want to preserve their
positions and to be sure that nobody
else will take over from them. If their
sense of their own security is
threatened, then other things will be
sacrificed, don't you think? And that's
why Hong Kong presents a problem for
them: if they take Hong Kong for

political reasons and try to maintain its
economy, but preserving Hong Kong's
economy somehow turns into a threat
to their political control, then there will
be a conflict of priorities.
Mr. Yu:

I agree with you and your ideas
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that China's number-one prerogative Is
to rule Hong Kong, as long as Hong
Kong is not a political threat to China's
leadership. This Is the formula, here at
least, for the behavior of the Chinese
government. However, I would also add
that Hong Kong and Its people, well,
they're not in China.
Professor Dellapenna:

In terms of expectations, it's
important to note that Hong Kong, up
until now, has been very, very highly
regionalized in the Western sense.
Having a British court system-which
places like Taiwan or Thailand or Korea
never had-puts Hong Kong in a very
unusual position. And the question Is,
in terms of Hong Kong, can Hong Kong
keep it? The mainland government, so
far, continues efforts to educate the
mass of people to think more
legalistically, which is really the key.
These are the people that survived
Tiananmen and the death of Deng
Xiaoping, at least so far. No one seems
seriously to challenge that block of
survivors, though that doesn't mean
they can't be challenged in the future.
This reasoning presupposes what I
think most observers do suppose:
namely, that the power struggle Is over,
that the power struggle was fought
before Deng Xiaoping's death was
announced.
If this assumption Is
correct, then this effort to legalize will
continue.
But if the real power struggle Is yet

to come, then the leadership and efforts
towards a legalistic society may be
challenged successfully. Regardless,
though, developing a law-oriented
society in China will take longer than in
places like Taiwan, if only because
China is a much bigger country, and
more people have to change in the way
they think or the way they act.
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I'd like to try to relate those ideas
with others we heard yesterday. As Dr.
[Edwin Lun-Cheung] Lai pointed out
yesterday, there may be a fascinating
parallel between the P.R.C. and Hong
Kong's economy with the events of
eighteenth century Europe, which
witnessed the rise of the business class
and the collapse of the monarchies. In
talking about whether China will ever
adopt the rule of law, a lot really does
fundamental
depend
on
your
philosophy and whether you believe
that law leads or law follows. Some
believe that the economics of a free
market is the driving force, and that the
law follows; others think the opposite,
and it may be the whole chicken-or-the
egg question.
If you look at the
situation in Europe, the Uniform
Commercial Code was not legislated in
the eighteenth century and seems to
have had, therefore, little to do with the
rise of commerce. Instead, I think it
was quice the inverse: we had the rise
of commerce, which ultimately led to a
legal system.
I think that is the long road to
China. It's almost organic: markets
grow and then you must have certain
rules in order to govern the markets.
As China's financial stakes grow, China
will ultimately become a more liberal
society. That liberality will emerge as a
result of what is essential to do in order
to preserve the market.
To relate this to current disputes
over intellectual property: the United
States is always on China's case for
China's failure to abide by the
intellectual property protections. But
it's significant that, for the first 100
years of the United States' history, we
pirated books from England regularly.
We did not recognize copyright
protection. It's much easier to be the
champion of intellectual property rights
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when you are the world's largest
exporter of intellectual property, as we
are now. China, within a very short
period of time, will become a net
exporter of intellectual property. Then,
I suspect, the Chinese will look quite
differently at intellectual property
protection.
Again, my fundamental point is
that a lot does depend on whether you
see the law as leading, or whether you
see the law as following in relation to
economics. The Communist Party will
change, even though not quite likely to
give up power. But there isn't a lot of
strong ideological orientation in the
party today, and as others have pointed
out, the Communist Party today Is
primarily a means for achieving status
and wealth in society.
As commerce increases and as the
markets expand, the most capable
persons in those transactions will
ultimately replace the "princelings"
anointed by the Communist Party. We
may have a difficult time with the
princelings in the short run, but sooner
or later-and we can see this in the
great dynastic families in this countryeach generation makes its own imprint
on its own time. And if the chosen
leadership is foolish enough
to
squander wealth, if it's not astute in
transactions, sooner or later there will
be a natural replacement. I think that is
quite likely to happen in China, just as
it has happened in the United States.
Professor Wesley-Smith:

To address this issue of the
relevance of the rule of law to Hong
Kong's economic well-being, well- I was
hoping that Professor [Edwin LunCheung] Lai would be here so I could
put this matter to him. The importance
of the rule of law is often stressed,
particularly, of course, by lawyers; the
rule of law makes lawyers look pretty
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good.
But that concept is also
expressed very strongly by the Hong
Kong government, which continually
emphasizes that the rule of law is
fundamental to the achievements of
Hong Kong and to its economic success
and that the rule of law must be
maintained accordingly.
Now, indeed, the Basic Law really
is, in terms of rule of law, a very
impressive document.
It seeks to
preserve all of the institutions of the
rule of law and the ideology of rule of
law in Hong Kong. Yet, studies of
Chinese
overseas
capitalism-and
indeed Hong Kong capitalism-indicate
that the rule of law is virtually irrelevant
to everyday business practices. These
studies suggest that what is far more
important are family connections,
kinship contacts, or guanxi in the more
general sense. Even in Hong Kong
among British "Hongs," it's the meetings
amongst the stewards at the Jockey
Club, who may be on the Board of the
Hong Kong Bank, where the major
business decisions get made. And these
business practices are not dependent
upon the courts or the formal structure
of the rule of law at all. Therefore, or so
the thinking goes, whether Hong Kong
remains a rule of law society is virtually
irrelevant in terms of economic success.
If that is indeed the case, then the Basic
Law, which is designed on rule of law
principles, may in fact be seen as totally
irrelevant.
That's an argument set forth by a
colleague of mine, Yash Ghai, who has
written a book on the Basic Law which
will be published at the end of next
month; anyone interested in the whole
Hong Kong question is welcome to buy
that book. I'm not sure whether his
argument is correct or not. I would like
to have heard more economists
comment on that.
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Audience Participant 7:

I think the comment on that Is the
fact that Hong Kong's rule of law has
not changed for the last forty years, but
Its prosperity certainly has.
That
prosperity was created by the change of
the market force more than any rule of
law. After China opened its door to the
world's economy, Hong Kong became a
gateway, and that's what caused Hong
Kong's prosperity, more than an Ideal
about rule of law.

Professor Rogers:

I would say, first, that this
argument about whether the law leads
or follows development in the economy
really misconstrues
the process,
because ultimately it is a reciprocal
interaction. The law affects the market;
the market affects the law. At one point
in time, one may have strictly
dominated; at another point, the other
may have strictly dominated. I could,
although I won't try to here, go through
various historical
examples that
demonstrate their interdependency.
I would also disagree with the
statement that the rule of law has not
changed in Hong Kong in the last forty
years. As an example of one of many
such significant changes, there Is the
Commission Against Corruption, which
was created less than twenty years ago.
The laws and principles it promulgates
are recognized as important at the very
highest levels; two weeks ago in Hong
Kong, for example, Anson Chan stated
that, before the creation of the
Commission Against Corruption, Hong
Kong was a very corrupt society. This
commission's work thus represents a
very important break-through; it's
something that allowed Hong Kong to
finally, really establish the rule of law
and a more reliable business climate.

Audience Participant 8:

It seems that the rule of law is
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often tied inversely to the rate and risk
of return on investment. You can have
a society, a capitalist society without
laws, but you will also have generally
high risk, high return type of projects.
Only when the rule of law is present,
lower risk-but lower return-projects
seem to emerge. This, if it's true, may
pose problems for Hong Kong, especially
for the lower risk-lower return projects
there: if the advantage of having the
law dissipates or the effect of the rule of
law dissolves, then we may very well see
those particular businesses going
under.
Professor Dellapenna:

Ted Hagelin keeps referring to
transitions that have happened in
Western Europe and the United States
as the model for what will happen in
China with the return of Hong Kong.
But China has a wealthy class of
entrepreneurs and merchants and, Ted,
I wonder why you wouldn't refer to
Mexico, or Brazil, or Columbia as the
model for China's markets; this model
is one in which money is siphoned out
of the country to benefit a select few
and no real progress is made for the
mass of the people. I'm not predicting
that sort of scenario will happen in
China or Hong Kong; I'm simply
wondering about the basis here for
constantly predicting the Chinese will
follow the North Atlantic model.

Professor Hagelin:

The short answer is that there are
over 4000 years of history in China of
"international" relations, while it seems
to be a quite different situation in
Mexico. You know, arguably, China is
extraordinarily attuned to customs and
codes and systems of conduct at many
levels of society. Look at the number of
regulations. Anybody who wants to do
a joint venture in China will certainly
encounter lots of laws. While laws have
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done unmitigated good, from a business

person's standpoint, laws nonetheless
represent transaction costs. It's a drag
on the system.
The most efficient
market in the United States is the
diamond trade market in New York City,
where millions and millions of dollars of
diamonds are exchanged every hour
with a handshake. To do a deal like
that, you need a certain kind of trust, a
certain kind of kinship. I don't think we
should necessarily assume that the
more pervasive the law, the better our
system is, the better our commercial
transactions are. One of the fun things
about witnessing this extraordinary
period in Asia is that it precipitates
some self-reflection about law and its
role in the United States. As we close
out the twentieth century, it could be
argued that the United States has
become overly regulated and overly
legalistic to our detriment. I don't know
if we should continue to pass laws for
another 100 years at the rate we were
passing them for the last 100 years; I
really do worry about that. I don't know
whether business can survive in the
environment it has to survive in right
now.
The number and variety of different
approval
processes
and
licenses
required for investments in China Is
extraordinary, but the laws and
regulations for U.S. businesses are
staggeringly complex too.
For example, I was asked to teach
a course a couple of years ago for the
engineering school in Syracuse for

engineers

who

were

going

into

management positions.
As part of
preparing the course, I decided to put
together a small compendium of the
various laws of which a small business
would have to be aware. The sheer
volume and complexity of those laws
were staggering; it was staggering to go
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through the environmental protections;
the workplace protections; the corporate
liability protections; and the tax
considerations. I have to say that, as
complex as the Chinese system is in
terms of doing business, it's not that
much easier to start a small business in
upstate New York.
Professor Maier:

When we start talking about what
we mean by the "rule of law," I have the
impression that most young attorneys
here and perhaps American lawyers
generally tend to think that "law"
consists solely of statutes and
regulations.
It's all very well to do that for some
purposes. In fact, that concept is what
one has to face most often when one
deals in business matters.
But it
doesn't necessarily follow that a failure
to adhere to each of the existing pieces
of writing on the books means that
there is no "law" in a particular system.
It's important to recall that, although I
don't know if the concept applies with
regard to the Chinese. But if you look
at Europe during the rise of the
mercantile groups, at the league of
cities engaged in trading, you see that
there was no central line of
governmental function; yet there were
"courts" scattered around the North
Sea. One was in Oslo. These courts
were non-governmental, but they
successfully enforced a law of
merchants; the rules were established
not by the state, but by customs and
practices in this Hansiatic League.
There was no enforcement mechanism
per se, except that you could lose a
place in a port by not obeying the
accepted practices, and then you would
find yourself outside the system-which
is, in effect, the worst punishment you
can possibly suffer if you're a business
person-not being able to be a business
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person in the system.
I wonder if, in fact, we may have
focused too narrowly when we talk
about the rule of law in China and the
role that the rule of law may or may not
play with respect to Hong Kong.
Perhaps we have focused too much on
the technical or formalized aspects of
law, rather than what legal mechanisms
may develop if the Chinese are truly
pragmatic, as they seem to be: it Is
pragmatism that drives this kind of
effective yet non-governmental systemone where, irrespective of whatever Is
on the books, all those trading know
how to proceed.
I don't know if that will prove to be
the end result, but it seems to me that
such a system functions as a sort of a
"way-station"-there may be better ways
to think about whether one ought to
take a group of statutes and declare
them wrong. Should one attempt to
redo them entirely?
In fact, the
accepted norms may suggest that
corruption is appropriate in certain
kinds of governmental relations, simply
because that's the way the system
functions.
This sort of custom with regard to
"corruption" happens to be true in
certain countries in Latin America. For
example, when you advise people about
shipping goods to certain Latin
American countries, one of the things
you have to include in the cost Is the
bribe required for customs officials so
they will put the right stamp on the
goods, a task they are supposed to do
anyway. It's accepted as a business
cost, which is one of the reasons the
Foreign Corrupt Practices Act doesn't
prevent it: it's a custom that is part of
doing business in certain Latin
American countries and also certain
countries in the Middle East.
Now, it's easy to say that's lawless,
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because of course, technically, the laws
on the books forbid that, but the
practice in the system suggests that
what the "law" is may be otherwise.
Consequently,
a
nation
is not
necessarily lawless because it has a set
of statutes which it doesn't in fact
follow. If the legal system is not so

efficiently developed that one can look
at the statutes and get some prediction
about how people will act, then one has
to look elsewhere. Maybe what one is
looking at isn't actually written down;
perhaps it is just what is done.
Audience Participant 9:

It seems there's a parallel between
what China is doing with the law and
what is developing with the use of
programming logic in technological
advances,
even
for
household
appliances: "programming logic" isn't a
strict sequencing, but rather a way of
achieving a result by various and often
alternate methods. For example, you
select a destination, a goal, then you
send out a message specifying the goal
and let the system find out itself how
best to get there. The programmatic
mind of Beijing is trying to accomplish a
certain goal with respect to Hong Kong,
and there may be many diverse ways to
reach it.

Professor Dellapenna:

My contention is much more
modest than I think you took it to be.
I'm not arguing that China must be a
legal society, or even that China would
become better off if it were to be a legal
society. I'm arguing that how things are

done in Hong Kong is likely to change
and that one significant result of that
change is that it will be more expensive
to do business in Hong Kong. If that is
a correct prediction, then the question
becomes whether it will become too
expensive to do business based in Hong
Kong when you could be based in
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Shanghai, or in Singapore, or in Manila,
or some other place. I think there's a
very serious risk that, because of the
way Hong Kong will change, business
will shift elsewhere.
Professor Rogers:

I see the focus as being basically
what Joe [Dellapennal is addressing,
but-this is a little bit of a new role for

me-I'd like to raise the human rights
concern yet again. The United States Is
a nation that cares about human rights,
and sometimes that leads us to take
very
narrow,
self-congratulatory
"preaching" positions. Since preaching
is something I try very hard to resist,
perhaps I'm not the person to make this
point. Yet there is, nonetheless, the
core precept that it's important for
human beings in the world to live in
societies where they have some
influence over the government that
controls their lives.
That power to
influence represents the basic political
responsibility to which I referred
yesterday, and it should be viewed as
just as important to us as being able to
do business.
If the United States confronts or
encounters societies that are resistant
to openness or completely repressed,
then that is going to interfere with our
economic relations with that societybut that's appropriate; we ought to care
enough about that.
The one thing I'd like to emphasize
is that there seems to be a patronizing
undercurrent, particularly in the U.S.
business community, but generally
across the board as well. It's present in
comments like, "China cannot become
like the United States," or "the
demonstrators in Tiananmen Square
were concerned only about corruption
and they didn't really know what
democracy was all about," or "the
Chinese culture will prevent China from
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ever having democracy the way we
understand democracy." I would like to
sound a note of warning: there may be
a little bit of condescension in such
attitudes.
We should be aware that, it's kind
of interesting sometimes, the Chinese
may take advantage of Western
condescensions. The general situation
reminds me of a book by Orwell called
Burmese Days, which illustrates how
corrupt influences took advantage of
Western condescensions in local power
struggles [in colonial Burma]. We need
to avoid letting people in China take
advantage
of our attitude
that
democracy won't work in China or
elsewhere in Asia, because there are
normally politically responsible systems
whereby people have really terrible
governments in check.
It's not
inconceivable that that can work in
Asia. The fact that there have been
elections in Taiwan, and even in Hong
Kong via the reform and functional
constituencies that Governor Patten
instituted, is encouraging. Theoretically
at least, everyone participated twice in
elections to secure representations. In
effect, if you were a worker, you had a

vote for that. If you lived somewhere,
which obviously you did, you had
another vote for where you lived.
Essentially, fifty of the sixty people In
the legislature were selected to be there
by these people who had these double
votes. That's a rough, but I think a
reasonably fair characterization.
Professor Dellapenna:

Yes, but we must recognize the fact
that several of these people who were
elected represented a very small
number of votes.

Professor Rogers:

I understand your point about the
apparent demographic discrepancy. All
the same we should recognize the big
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picture-the picture that the Chinese
government saw-that such elections
are more democratic and represent a
step towards a system more politically
responsible. This is giving voters In
Hong Kong some control over their
destiny.
Such elections, in an
important sense, are fundamentally
destabilizing to the prime Chinese
directive of asserting full control.
Professor Dellapenna:

You may remember that Jimmy
Carter gained a certain amount of fame
and notoriety--depending on how you
looked at his approach-for putting
human rights foremost in his foreign
policy.
Yet, one of the notable
exceptions

to

Carter's

policy

of

emphasizing human rights was the
P.R.C.

Stories go around the halls in
Washington, one of which may be
aprocryphal, but it nonetheless makes a
point:
during 1979, Deng Xiaoping
visited the U.S., right after normalized
relations between the P.R.C. and the
U.S. were established. At the first
private meeting between Jimmy Carter
and Deng Xiaoping, Carter brought up
the question of the Chinese human
rights record, mentioning in particular
the government repression of dissent.
Deng Xiaoping apparently had done his
homework and, according to the story,
responded in this fashion: He said, "I
think you're absolutely right; I think It's

wrong for us to refuse to allow people to
express their opinion, and I've decided
upon a way to solve that problem, since
we've got a very strong history of
instability in China, and we really can't
maintain stability if I go back and just

allow people to speak. So, what I'm
going to do when I go back is to open
the borders and allow anyone who
doesn't like the government to leave,
How many millions will you take?" End
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of Discussion.
See, there is a condescension;
there is a double standard. When the
people in Tiananmen demonstrated,
even if it was not in a political science
sense, they showed us that there is an
aspiration in China for democracy and
the rule of law.
The fact of their
aspiration directly contradicts what is
commonly thought in the West, which is
to say that the Chinese doint value the
potential and power of law. We should
not ignore that aspiration, and we
should remember that it is precisely in
those human rights areas where the
rule of law becomes most vulnerable
and most important.

Ms. Douglas:

To jump from the rule of law to the
rulers of politics: in the last three or
four days two of our top political leaders
have been in China. Newt Gingrich is
there now and apparently gave a
speech-which
was
not
entirely
diplomatic by most of this morning's
news accounts-at a Chinese School of

Diplomacy.

Vice President Gore has

been there, also. My question to each of
you is this:
supposing that our
leadership in the United States would

listen, what advice would you give them
with regard to their posture towards
China and Hong Kong? And, also, for

all of us who have spent the last day
and a half learning about this issue,
what role should we be playing as
attorneys and observers as positions
evolve?
Professor Rogers:

Your first question is very well
taken, and of course is one about which
policymakers in Washington
are
concerned, especially because China is
this extremely powerful, if not the
major, player that we will be playing
with or against-however you look at
it-in the next century. This jargon of
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whether we should "contain" or
"engage" them persists.
Yet the jargon can obscure what Is
important to do; it's very difficult Just to
go one way or the other. What we have
to do is to identify for ourselves what's
important and what we really care
about as a nation. Then we have to
prioritize those concerns: insist on the
ones we're willing to back and not
"insist" on the ones that we're willing to
let slide. The danger occurs when we
start trying to hint that we might do
something that they know, and we
Threatening
know, we won't do.
withdrawal
of most-favored-nation
status is one example of this-it's
playing their negotiating game. Instead,
what we have to do is to pick a few
choice issues and consistently insist
upon them.
And we'll be polite. We'll do the
visits and the exchanges, and we'll
drink just as many mao tai's. But when
it comes down to the certain choice
issues that represent the bottom line,
we'll be consistent and not back down.
If the issue Is intellectual property
rights, then we have to be able to insist
on intellectual property rights. If the
Chinese come back and say "don't
worry; we'U take care of that," and we
smile in approval only to have them not
take care of it a year later, and then we
say "don't worry about it; we'll go on to
another issue"- that's not consistent,
The Chinese can see through that; they
think "oh, that's just the American
government saving face; they don't
really require it after all." So I think we
can't have all the changes [in Chinese
behavior that] we want, but by the same
token we shouldn't say relations with
China are so important that we can't let
a particular concern, say, Tibet, get in
the way. We can't declare that relations
are so important to China that we can't
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let Taiwanese rights get in the way, or
that we can't let intellectual property
rights get in the way. I'm beginning to
wonder what it is that is going to be
something we care about when we
negotiate with China, what concerns we
wUl let get in the way. If I'm wondering,
then there must be some bewilderment
in China too.
Professor Dellapenna:

Madeleine Albright addressed this
issue in her first press conference after

she became Secretary of State. She was
asked what she thought would be the
proper reaction if the Chinese violated
the terms of the Hong Kong Relations
Act, which requires the United States to
impose trade sanctions if Hong Kong's
economy is not respected. You know
how she answered? She said, "I think it
would be a mistake to allow our policy
towards China to become a hostage to
any one issue." So much for the Hong
Kong Relations Act.
Mr. Yu:

I would like to comment on the
history of the P.R.C. and the United
States in terms of human rights. In the
past few years-at least since 1989-the
human rights issue has become
prominent not so much because any
government had an interest in human
rights, but primarily because the
American people raised their voices up
and the government had to take action.
Americans have learned it's necessary
to find different ways to deal with
human rights with China; they are
realizing, gradually, that most-favorednation (hereinafter MFN) status has lost
its earlier importance as a tool for
pushing China toward better reforms of
human rights abuses.

It is fair to say that the American
government cannot afford to lose
economic ties with China by repealing

MFN status with the P.RIC. Both the
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Chinese and the American governments
are very aware of this fact, that the
question of U.S. Congressional renewal
of MFN status is a game that Is played
each time the question comes up.
Every year before the June 3 or June 4
anniversary of the Tiananmen Square
massacre, the Chinese government
releases some political dissident held
prisoner, in exchange for a favorable
review and grant of continued MFN
status. Maybe two weeks after MFN
status is bestowed once again, the
Chinese government cracks down and
detains another group of people. And
this game is continually played among
the countries. It's really important that
the governments of both the P.R.C. and
the U.S. listen to the people of China
and the people of the United States.
The American govemment should deal
with China more seriously and in full
sincerity; if the U.S. can't, in practice,
really withdraw MFN status, then just
don't say that. Yet if the U.S. wants, for
example, to see greater justice done in
Chinese courts, then the U.S. should
say that to China, and tie it to an
available economic deal, and make the
Chinese
government
know
the
Americans are serious. Right now, the
U.S. does not have a history of
consistency so there is a poor
reputation on the issue of MFN and
human rights. So the Chinese officials
view the U.S. position with skepticism,
and they are left with saying, what do
we do? If the U.S. wants to take MFN
status away, take it all; if you won't,
don't threaten to do so; just drop it. If
this game continues, it won't do any
good for the Chinese human lights
forces.
In my understanding, every year in
the U.N. Human Rights Commission,
there is a resolution proposed by the
United States and other western
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countries that attempts to try to criticize

the Chinese government's human rights
record. But I personally question how
effective
these
efforts
by
the
governments are, because they don't
seem to achieve any specific results.
There is always the question of whether
the resolution is sincerely proposed,
whether
the proponents
of this
resolution really want to pass it, or if
they just want to be on record and
posture. At the end of each session, the
world finds that no resolution ever
passed; it's just a way to try to pressure
the Chinese government by proposing a
strong kind of resolution.
It's all a
game to appease the people, but it's a
kind of hypocrisy. So the Chinese think
they have to take it seriously.
So if the western governments of
the world sincerely want to take on the
human rights issues, they have to deal
with the Chinese government in a very
honorable way, not just with empty
words.

Professor Hagelin:

Again, I find myself counterbalancing the position on the other side

of the table.
Professor Dellapenna:

Professor Maier:
Professor Hagelin:

You'd
friends.

never

guess

we're

old

Oh, yes we would.
No doubt there are human rights
issues in China regarding which the
U.S. rightfully ought to try to, I will say,
nudge China forward, though not insist.
But to give a direct response to
Laurelyn's [Douglas] question as to
what I'd advise, I'd go back to Hal's
[Mater] point about domestic politics.
As those of you who are parents
know, in raising children you need to
find the fine line between congratulating
them
on
their
successes
and
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achievements and directing them
toward other things. If all you do is give
feedback that is negative, that is very,
very, very harmful. Consequently, my
advice to policy-makers would be to
spend as much time as possible
recognizing some of the extraordinary
achievements that China has made.
Keep in mind that China's a country
that, thirty years ago, was in virtual
anarchy and, as we tend to think of it,
The tremendous
absolutely lawless.
fear in Beijing is instability; It's that
People over the age of
lawlessness.
thirty-five or forty in China who lived
through this lawlessness understand
this first-hand. From the United States'
standpoint and that of the Western
Hemisphere generally, the worst case
scenario would be to have China's going
into that unstable condition again;
economic and trade relations are just a
part of the picture. The potential for
instability poses an enormous risk to all
of Asia. We need to work to help China
We need to
be a stable country.
recognize China's very recent history of
also
the
anarchy
and
relative
advances
China
has
extraordinary
made in a very short period of time.
To communicate in terms of
domestic politics-and I've done no
quantitative study on this, but It's
readily apparent from watching NPR
and network news-Asia has become
much more prevalent in our news than
Europe or the [former] USSR. Although
Asia is very regularly in the news now,
I'm concerned with the quality and lack
of depth in reporting on Asia at this
point. It does seem to me that most of
the reporting on Asia follows whatever
the government in power In Washington
has in mind; there's not a great deal of
discussion of various viewpoints.
My advice, as part of reaching a
mature policy with China, would be to
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continue to broaden the debate that
we're having here today in further
public forums, because it's a wonderful
debate and that debate needs to be
ongoing within the American public.
We're going to need better reporting and
more forums like this; otherwise, we'll
be too ignorant to know how and where
best to proceed. To illustrate, I offer a
short story: I went to get a haircut
before I came to this conference and
was talking about my upcoming trip to
Hong Kong. My hairdresser said, "Well,
what is the food like in Japan?" That
brought the issue home: we really do
need to broaden the knowledge and
awareness of this country about other
areas, especially in the Asia-Pacific
region.
Professor Maier:

I'm going to let that be the second

to last comment. The last one will be
mine. I have not enjoyed myself as
much as I have today in a long, long
time; I'd like to congratulate the
speakers here and the students who
organized these sessions, and to
encourage everyone to continue to think
and talk about issues raised here.
The debate, of course, is not going
to be resolved here. But I do believe
these discussions have opened up what
one ought to open in these contexts. I
am not referring to specific answers,
because the answers are pretty easy
when people find them. Rather, I refer
to the questions raised, because there's
no way to get to the right answers
unless you've raised the right questions.
So I offer my thanks to everyone who
has helped in that process and an
invitation to continue the dialogue
further.
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